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Abstract
We estimate four models of female labour supply using a Spanish sample
of married women from 1994, taking into account the complete form of the
individual’s budget set. The models differ in the hypotheses relating to the
presence of optimisation errors and/or the way non-workers contribute to
the likelihood function. According to the results, the effects of wages and
non-labour income on the labour supply of Spanish married women
depend on the specification used. The model which has both preference
and optimisation errors and allows for both voluntarily and involuntarily
unemployed females desiring to participate seems to better fit the
evidence for Spanish married women.1
I.INTRODUCTION
The importance of specification issues in estimating labour supply
models is well known
1. Not only econometric aspects such as sample
selection problems related to wages, the fact that the endogenous variable
is censored, or the distributional assumptions
2, but also other specification
aspects are relevant. In that sense, the empirical literature has taken note
of the importance of the characteristics of the budget set (tax system)
3, the
specification of different models for the participation decision and the
hours equation
4, the consideration of restrictions on labour supply
5, or the
analysis of household labour supply decisions rather than individual ones
6.
In this paper we put forward evidence of the importance of
modelling how the process of forming the observed decisions can take
place. In particular, we estimate different models for the labour supply
decisions of Spanish married women which differ in the assumptions about
how the relationship between desired and observed participation and
hours decisions are specified
7. Additionally, we also try to shed some light
on the impact of considering two different types of unobserved
heterogeneity (preference and optimisation errors) against the case with
only one source. The evidence, based on the estimated coefficients, on
the explanatory power of the models and on the estimated wage and
income elasticities, depends on these assumptions.2
The models are estimated using the information contained in the
1994 and 1995 waves of the European Household Panel for Spain and
they have a more realistic specification of the budget set than previous
studies of the Spanish case, in terms of considering all the tax brackets
8
and allowing the possibility of choosing between separate and joint
taxation as was possible in Spain in the period considered
9. The
estimation procedure corresponds to what is known in the literature as
Hausman´s approach
10, assuming a linear specification for the labour
supply equation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we
present the main assumptions regarding individual preferences, budget
constraints and the process of observing an individual as a non-worker or
working a particular number of hours. The econometric specification is
outlined in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe the data and the main
characteristics of the Spanish tax system and we present the maximum
likelihood estimates. In Section 5 wage and income elasticities are
calculated and Section 6 sets out conclusions.
II. THE MODEL
We specify a static neoclassical labour supply model which
incorporates the main characteristics of the Spanish tax system. The
desired working time is assumed to be linear in wage and non-labour3
income. This latter variable includes the husband’s income because we
assume that the wife’s labour behaviour is independent of that of her
husband’s. Besides those two explanatory variables, personal and
household characteristics may contribute to explain female working time.
Finally, we add an unobserved heterogeneity random component in the
utility function, which explains why two individuals with the same economic
and socio-demographic characteristics can be working for a different
number of hours per week.
Consumption and hours of work are determined so as to maximise
the individual’s utility function subject to a piecewise-linear budget
constraint:
where U denotes utility, c is consumption expenditure, h is weekly working
time, X is a vector of socio-demographic variables which may affect
individual tastes, e is the preference random term, wk is the after-tax hourly
wage [wk = w(1-tk), tk being the marginal tax rate for segment k and w the
gross wage], yk, which is usually termed virtual income, is the intercept we
would obtain if the segment k were extended to zero hours of work, Hk is
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the upper kink point for segment k and T is the total time endowment. The
subscripts referring to individuals are omitted in order to simplify the
notation.
Thus, the budget constraint consists of a number, K, of segments,
each one defined by its net wage, its virtual income, and the kink points.
Virtual income for tax bracket k is given by the following expression:
where y is the net non-labour income the wife receives when she does not
work.
The specification of the budget set requires the calculation of the
kink points, that is, the values of working time in which there is a change in
the marginal tax rate. We then obtain the after-tax earnings at each kink
and calculate the marginal tax rate of each segment by assuming that the
budget set is linear between two consecutive kink points and that the
marginal tax rate of a particular segment is greater than or equal to that of
the previous one. In fact, the fiscal deductions and the possibility for
married couples to choose either joint or separate taxation may produce
nonconvexities in the tax schedule but, given the large number of tax
brackets in the Spanish system, this linearization should not generate any
special distortion in the results.
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s denotes the number of desired working hours, e is the preference
error, which is assumed to be normally distributed with constant variance
sp
2, and gk is the non-random component of the labour supply:
where a1, a2 and b are parameters.
We specify four alternative models, which differ with regard to the
hypothesis about the optimisation error and/or the likelihood contribution of
non-workers. Model 1 considers that individuals are not always free to
choose their working time, so there may be differences between the
number of desired and usual hours of work and there may be involuntarily
unemployed people
12. We assume that workers always desire a positive
working time, because they can stop working whenever they want. Non-
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workers, however, may be in that situation either voluntarily or
involuntarily. Thus, the observed working time will be equal to:
where h
a is the actual working time, and u, the optimisation error, which is
normally distributed with variance so
2 and is independent of the preference
error e.
Model 2 assumes that there may be optimisation errors but every
non-worker is voluntarily in that labour situation, i.e., both preferred and
observed decisions coincide for them. The observed working time is thus
given by:
The main hypothesis of Model 3 is that there are no differences
between the desired and usual working time (h
a = h
s), so there are no
optimisation errors.
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Finally, the database used in the estimation allows us to know
whether non-working women are involuntarily unemployed or non-
participants. The three previous models do not use this information but
Model 4 does. Specifically, this model assumes that women classified as
non-participants in the survey are not in the labour force, i.e., in their case
desired and observed situations coincide.
III. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
Following Hausman´s approach we estimate the model by
maximum likelihood taking into account the characteristics of the budget
set. In this section we present the likelihood functions for the four different
specifications proposed.
Model 1 assumes that there is an optimisation error and allows for
involuntary unemployment. As the usual working time may be different
from the desired one, we do not know the value of the latter variable. For
workers, we only know that they desire to work a positive number of hours,
so the probability of a woman working h
a
i hours is equal to the joint
probability of desired hours being at any point on the individual’s budget
constraint and observed hours being equal to h
a
i :8
The first term is the probability of observing a person working h
a
i
hours per week when she desires to work along the segment k. Taking
into account the assumptions about the labour supply function and the
random terms, this probability can be written as:
The second term is the probability of desiring to work at any kink
point (Hk) and working h
a
i  and is given by:
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The contribution to the likelihood of a non-worker is equal to the
probability that she does not desire to work or she wants to work but has
not found a job:
where the terms of the previous equation have the following expressions:
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The log-likelihood function is constructed from the equations (7)-
(11) and takes the form:
where di is a dummy variable which takes the value of one when the
individual is working and zero otherwise. Maximising the log-likelihood
function produces estimates of the labour supply coefficients and the
standard deviation of both random terms. In fact, equation (12) represents
the general form of the likelihood function for our four models, which differ
in the way the contributions of both workers and non-workers are defined.
Model 2 assumes that there are no involuntarily unemployed
people. The likelihood function is the same as equation (12), but in this
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In Model 3 we do not include optimisation errors, so the actual
working time is always equal to the desired one. The construction of the
likelihood function is simpler than the previous ones. The probability of
observing zero hours of work is the same as in Model 2 [equation (13)]. On
the other hand, the probability of working h
a
i  hours, where h
a
i is located on
segment k, is equal to the probability of desiring that value of working time:
Finally, Model 4 differs from the first one in the specification of the
probability of non-working. According to Model 1, every non-worker may
be voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed. Model 4 uses the information
provided by the survey about the labour situation of these women. It
assumes that those females who state that they are non-participants do
not belong to the labour force, so their likelihood contribution is given by
equation (13). Therefore, we have three types of contributions to the
likelihood function, that of workers, that of involuntarily unemployed and
that of voluntarily unemployed.
By comparing the estimation results for these four models we can
evaluate the importance of the behavioural assumptions and the role of
the error terms when estimating a labour supply model for married women
























terms of its influence on the estimated coefficients, in particular those
relevant in economic terms, such as the income and wage elasticities.
IV. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION
The estimation of the four models is based on a sample of married
women drawn in 1994. In the first subsection, we describe the 1994
Spanish income tax focusing on the characteristics we have taken into
account when specifying the budget constraint. In addition, we comment
the sample selection and the variables used in the estimation. The second
subsection presents the results of the estimation of the four models
mentioned above.
Data and Spanish income tax system in 1994
Spanish income tax, known as IRPF (Impuesto sobre la Renta de
las Personas Físicas), in 1994 is a piecewise linear function of taxable
income, with the marginal tax rates increasing from 0% to 56%. Married
couples have the possibility of complying with their fiscal duties jointly or
separately. The number of tax brackets are eighteen or seventeen
depending on the regime chosen.
Taxable income is the sum of gross labour and non-labour earnings
minus some quantities that can be deducted before applying the tax rates,13
such as Social Security payments. After calculating the taxable income,
the individual has to apply the table of marginal tax rates, and from the
amount obtained he/she can make certain deductions. We have
considered deductions for children, parents, wage income and house rent.
There are also other fiscal deductions, for example, housing allowances,
but we do not have enough information to take account these into. Some
of these deductions have limits which may introduce nonconvexities in the
budget set. As we have already mentioned, when this happens we use a
convex approximation, by assuming the linearity of the budget set
between two consecutive kink points and establishing that the marginal tax
rate in a segment is always greater or equal to that of the previous one.
Moreover, married couples can choose either to pay tax jointly or
individually and they are likely to opt for the regime which implies the least
amount of tax payment. We assume that those couples where the wife
does not work pay tax jointly, because this is usually the best option for
them, and when the woman works, we calculate the taxes the couple
would pay under each regime and we assigned them the most favourable
one
13.
The data we use for estimating the four models come from the
Spanish section of the European Household Panel which is carried out in
Spain by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. It is collected at the
household level and provides information about personal and household
characteristics. We have chosen it because it contains very detailed data14
about income, and thus allows for a better approximation of the individual’s
budget set than other surveys available for Spain.
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of married women who
are living with their husbands and are not the household head. The family
may also be made up of children, parents and parents-in-law. We have
restricted the analysis to couples between 16 and 65 years old. We have
eliminated observations where any member had changed to a new
household from 1994 to 1995, the wife was self-employed or there was
missing data. These selection rules leave us with a sample size of 2586
observations of whom 576 are working.
The dependent variable is the usual weekly working time. Turning
to the explanatory factors, we include the net wage and virtual income.
The wage is measured using information about monthly earnings and
weekly working hours. The virtual income is calculated as previously
explained [see equation (2)]. For its calculation we need the net nonlabour
income the woman would have if she did not work and we assume that it
consists of the net husband’s labour earnings and the net family nonlabour
earnings .
Labour supply is also influenced by a vector of socio-demographic
variables (X). We assume that individual’s age and health may influence
labour supply decisions. This latter variable is equal to one for those
women who are in good health and this is likely to have a positive effect15
on labour supply. Family characteristics included are the number of
children under 14, the number of members over 14 and a dummy variable
which takes the value one when the woman looks after children or adults.
Moreover, we incorporate the monthly payments due to mortgage loans as
a way of capturing its effect through the budget set, since we do not have
enough information to calculate housing allowances but we think the
mortgage payments may increase the female labour supply. Finally, we
have also incorporated regional dummies.
Results
In the estimation we have taken into account the fact that the wage
is not observed for non-workers and it may be correlated with the labour
supply random term
14. To deal with these problems we substitute wages
(observed or not) by its prediction, so the estimation has been carried out
in three stages. First of all, we fit a probit model for the probability of
working. Secondly, we estimate a wage equation with the subsample of
workers and incorporating the inverse Mills ratio as an explanatory
variable. The dependent variable in this equation is the (log) gross hourly
earnings. We then calculate net wages and virtual incomes for each
woman using the predicted gross wage. Finally, we estimate the female
labour supply model by maximum likelihood. The estimates for the probit
and the wage equation are shown in Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix.16
In Table 1 we report the maximum likelihood estimates of Model 1,
which has two random terms and allows for involuntary unemployment.
We base our comments on the effects of the explanatory variables on the
estimation which considers the most preferable tax regime. Wages have a
positive effect on the desired labour supply whereas nonlabour income
has a negative one, being both significantly different from zero. Therefore,
these coefficients satisfy the Slutsky condition. Female age increases
labour supply at a decreasing rate and mortgage payments also have a
positive influence. On the contrary, but as expected, family characteristics
–number of children under 14 and the dummy for children/adult care-
decrease the labour supply of married women. This latter result confirms
the importance of housework in explaining female labour behaviour. With
regard to regional variables, women living in the East desire longer
working hours than the rest.
(TABLE 1)
The standard deviations of both random terms are significant, being
greater that of the preference error. The variation of the observed working
time is therefore better explained by differences in individual tastes than by
other types of reasons
15. On the other hand, the significance of the
optimisation error highlights the existence of differences between desired
and observed working hours.17
When comparing the three versions of Model 1 in Table 1 we must
point out the significant increase in the value of the likelihood function
when estimating the model in which the most preferable tax regime for
each individual is considered. That means that the behaviour of individuals
is better explained by a model based on a more complete utility
maximization framework, proxied by the most favourable tax regime.
Consequently, the simplifications in terms of the budget set imposed by
the versions corresponding to both the individual tax regime and the joint
tax regime could imply inconsistent estimates, as shown, in particular,
when looking at the estimates of the coefficients of the virtual income,
positive in the joint tax regime version.
Table 2 presents estimates of the four models for the version in
which couples choose the most favourable tax regime. The values of the
likelihood function for that four models show that the first model, more
general than Models 2 and 3, and with different behavioural assumptions
than Model 4, better explains the labour supply decisions of Spanish
females (the value of the likelihood function is about 10% higher for Model
1 than for the rest). In fact, the worst model is the simplest one (Model 3)
which only considers preference errors.
When we have not taken into account the presence of involuntary
unemployment (Model 2) there are important changes in the coefficients.
In particular, the nonlabour income is not now significant and the wage
coefficient is much smaller than that of Model 1.18
(TABLE 2)
Turning to Model 3, which assumes that there is no optimisation
error, the most outstanding result is that the coefficient of nonlabour
income is positive and significant, contrary to the theory. However, the
substitution effect is positive when the working time is under 49.7 hours
per week, so a high proportion of the sample will satisfy the Slutsky
condition. The rest of the results are similar to Model 2.
Model 4 distinguishes between unemployed and non-participant
females. It differs from Model 1 in the specification of the likelihood
contribution for non-workers. In particular, it assumes that those non-
workers who are classified as non-participants are not looking for a job.
Comparing the results of Models 1 and 4, we can see that, although there
are no changes in the signs of the coefficients, there are differences in
their values. For example, the effect of the net wage on the female labour
supply is lower in Model 4 than in Model 1 and the nonlabour income is
not significant in Model 4. On the other hand, health and the number of
members over 14 are significantly different from zero in the latter model.
Although all the models show that labour supply decisions have a
high degree of dependence on socio-demographic and economic
variables and also present similar estimates for the variances of the error
terms, the results show that the specification of how these decisions are19
made and the different role of unobserved error terms are relevant when
modelling labour supply and estimating relevant parameters such as wage
and income elasticities, as will be shown in the next section. In fact, the
coefficient estimates of wage and income variables are higher in absolute
value for Model 1 than for the rest of the models.
V. WAGE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES
The calculation of the wage and income elasticities will allow us to
evaluate the responses of the female labour supply when any of those
variables changes. As the budget set is piecewise linear, the labour supply
is not differentiable because an increase in any explanatory factor may
produce a change of segment or kink. That is the reason why prefer to
obtain the elasticities by performing simulation exercises.
In the simulation, the values of the random terms are assigned to
each woman in such a way that the predicted initial number of hours is the
same as the observed one. For Model 1, we draw a value of the
preference error for each woman, such that workers desire a positive
number of hours. The optimisation error for that group is calculated as the
difference between the desired and usual working time, whereas, for non-
workers, we draw a value of that term satisfying the condition that the
predicted number of hours cannot be positive. In Model 2 the preference
error assigned to non-workers cannot yield a positive desired number of20
working hours. In addition, in Model 3 the preference error for workers is
just the difference between the hours of work and the non-random
component of the labour supply function. Finally, the procedure applied to
Model 4 differs from Model 1 in that the preference error is drawn in such a
way that non-participants cannot be predicted desiring to work.
The first simulation exercise analyses the effect of a 10% increase
in wages on participation and hours of work. The second one considers a
10% increase in the husband’s earnings, which is part of his wife’s
nonlabour income. In both cases we add the individual effects over the
whole sample.
Table 3 presents the results for the wage elasticities of the
simulations for the four models proposed, in the version which considers
for each individual the most favourable taxation regime. In particular, we
report the participation elasticity (which provides information about the
variation in the number of participants), the elasticity of hours (which
shows the change in average hours worked by participants), and the total
elasticity, which is roughly the sum of the other two, for both desired and
observed situations.
(TABLE 3)
According to the elasticities obtained for Model 1, wages have a
positive effect on the number of women desiring to participate and on the
desired number of hours conditional on participation. Given that there are21
a number of initial non-working women for whom the predicted number of
weekly hours is very small after the increase in their wage, and as it is very
unusual to observe such small values, we restrict the condition of
participation to people working at least five hours a week when calculating
the elasticities for the observed hours. These elasticities show more
reasonable values than those obtained without this assumption. Moreover,
our results are similar to those obtained in other studies applied to Spanish
women. For example, García et al. (1989) compute a participation
elasticity equal to 1.56 and the elasticity of hours conditional on work is
0.29, whereas those calculated in García et al. (1993) are 1.35 and 0.29,
respectively. As in those studies, in our case the participation responses
are geater than the working time responses.
There are important differences in the elasticities depending on the
model considered. For Models 2, 3 and 4 they are considerably smaller
than those of Model 1, all, in fact, being lower than one, and with the
elasticity of participation smaller than that of observed hours in the case of
Models 2 and 3.
With respect to the income elasticities, we analyse the effect of a
10% increase in the husband’s gross labour earnings. This variable only
has an income effect on the labour supply of women who pay tax
separately but, when the couple pay taxes jointly, its influence on female
labour supply is more complex because the net wages can change for the
first segment of the budget set. That is the reason why participation may22
increase, as it can be seen in Table 4, where we report the income
elasticities for all the models and for both desired and observed situations.
(TABLE 4)
In general, an increase in the husband’s nonlabour earnings has a
negative influence on the average desired working time. However, the
observed participation increases for all four models. In any case, the
response of participation and hours of work is very small (always lower
than one), a result frequently obtained in the empirical literature about
labour supply
16. The estimated elasticities differ very much among the four
models considered in this exercise.
As was expected after looking at the differences in the estimated
coefficients and the explanatory power for those four models, we also find
significant differences in the estimated wage and income elasticities
depending on both behavioural assumptions and the specification of
different sources for unobserved heterogeneity.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed four different specifications to explain the labour
supply of married women taking into account the Spanish tax system. The
models differ in the behavioural assumptions about participation and the23
role of preference and optimisation errors. All of them are static and have
been estimated using Hausman´s approach.
Individual preferences are assumed to generate a linear labour
supply and the individual’s budget set is convex and consists of several
segments. The four models have a random term representing unobserved
factors which may affect the female’s preferences towards working time
and consumption. On the other hand, in three specifications we also
include an optimisation error which may explain the presence of
differences between observed and desired hours of work.
Model 1 assumes that there are preference and optimisation errors
and involuntary unemployment in that there are women who desire to
participate but who do not work due to the optimisation term. Model 2
excludes the possibility of involuntary unemployment. However, it takes
account of the possibility that actual working time differs from that desired
by workers. Model 3 has only a random component which represents the
heterogeneity in individual preferences. Model 4 is similar to the first one in
that it has two stochastic terms and assumes involuntary unemployment,
but differs from Model 1 because it uses the available sample information
on the classification of a non-worker as unemployed or non-participant. In
particular, it considers that women who affirm that they do not want to
work have a desired working time equal to zero hours.24
We found that personal and family characteristics, as well as
economic variables, affect the labour supply of married women. We
performed simulations to calculate wage and income elasticities and
obtained results showing that the former are generally larger than the
latter. The comparison of the log-likelihood values allows us to conclude
that Model 1 is preferred to the other three proposed. However, there is a
wide variation in results depending on the specification, which points out
the importance of the specification issues considered in this study when
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Table 1. Maximum likelihood estimates of the labour supply (Model1)







Variables Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Constant







No. members ‡ 14






















































































































Log L -3480.52 -3533.75 -3361.60
Sample size 2586
Note: Model 1 has optimisation and preference errors and allows for involuntary
unemployment. Omitted dummies are: bad health, not looking after children/adult and
Canary Islands.30
Table 2. Maximum likelihood estimates of female labour supply
(Dependent variable: weekly hours of work)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4









No. members ‡ 14
























































































































































Log L -3361.60 -3706.38 -3755.30 -3688.61
Sample size 2586
Notes: The difference between Models 1 and 2 is that the first one allows for involuntary
unemployment. Model 3 assumes that there are only preference errors. Model 4 assumes
that non-participants do not desire to work a positive number of hours. In all models each
woman is assumed to choose the most favourable taxation regime. Omitted dummies
are: bad health, not looking after children/adult and Canary Islands.31
Table 3. Wage elasticities































*Restricting the analysis to people whose working time is at least 5 hours a week.
Notes: The same as Table 2.32
Table 4. Income elasticities































*Restricting the analysis to people whose working time is at least 5 hours a week.
Notes: The same as Table 2.33











Net annual nonlabour income*





Unemployment in last 5 years
Age
No. children < 14





















































































Table A2. Probit estimates for the probability of working
Variables Coefficients t-values
Constant







Unemployment in last 5 years
Health
No. members >14


































































































                                           
1 See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a complete and recent discussion on those issues
related to estimating labour supply models.
2 See the seminal papers by Heckman (1974, 1979) for the first two issues and Blundell
and Meghir (1986) for the third one.
3 See, for example, Burtless and Hausman (1978) and García (1991a), among others.
4 See Blundell et al. (1987).
5 See, for example, Van Soest et al. (1990), Dickens and Lundberg (1993) and Bloemen
(2000).
6 See Hausman and Ruud (1984), Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992) or Fortin and
Lacroix (1997).
7 In Spain there are several empirical studies of female labour supply, some of them
taking into account the characteristics of the budget set [García et al. (1989, 1993),
Segura (1996), Álvarez and Prieto (2000) and Arrazola et al. (2000)], whereas this is not
the case in other papers [Martínez-Granado (1994), Alonso and Fernández (1995),
García and Molina (1998), Fernández et al. (1999) or Fernández (2000)].
8 García et al. (1989, 1993) and Segura (1996) simplify the budget set assuming that
there are only three tax brackets, whereas Álvarez and Prieto (2000) and Arrazola et al.
(2000) do not specify the entire budget restriction.
9 See García et al. (1989) for an empirical analysis of 1988 reform of the system of direct
taxation in Spain moving from joint to either joint or separate taxation.
10 The Hausman method (Hausman, 1981) has been often used in the empirical studies
about labour supply with taxes. See, for example, Zabalza (1983), Arrufat and Zabalza
(1986), Bourguignon and Magnac (1990) or Colombino and del Boca (1990). Another
possibility is the use of the instrumental variables method. Blomquist (1996) and Blundell
and MaCurdy (1999) compare both techniques.














































This functional form has been often used in the literature about labour supply. See, for
example, Hausman (1981), Colombino and del Boca (1990), Triest (1990) or Van Soest
et al. (1990) .
12 See Suárez (2000) for an empirical analysis of female labour supply in Spain when
there are job offer restrictions.
13 This is a way of avoiding the nonconvexity which would be generated by considering
both regimes simultaneously.
14 See García (1991b) for a complete discussion on the implications of the way of carrying
out this kind of instrumental approach when estimating labour supply models.
15 The evidence in the literature about the values of the standard deviations is varied. For
example, in Arrufat and Zabalza (1986) and in García et al. (1993) for the Spanish case,
the standard deviation of the preference error is greater than the other, whereas Triest
(1990) finds the contrary in some of his estimates.37
                                                                                                                       
16 For the Spanish case, Segura (1996) computes income elasticities of hours conditional
on participation that are negative and smaller than one.